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Is	it	labour	or	capital	owners	who	bear	the	burden	of
corporate	taxation?
The	incidence	of	corporate	taxation	is	a	key	issue	in	tax	policy	debates.	According	to	surveys,	most	people	think	that
capital	owners	bear	the	burden	of	corporate	taxation.	Since	capital	owners	usually	have	high	incomes,	this	suggests
that	the	corporate	tax	is	highly	progressive.	Business	lobbyists	challenge	this	view	and	argue	that	the	tax	reduces
investment	so	that	labour	productivity	and	wages	decline,	which	means	that	workers	bear	the	tax	burden.
Most	economists	take	a	middle	ground	and	think	that	the	tax	burden	is	shared	between	labour	and	capital.	But	even
among	researchers	in	the	field,	there	is	substantial	disagreement	about	how	much	of	the	burden	is	shifted	to
workers.	The	main	reason	is	that	credible	empirical	evidence	on	the	causal	effect	of	corporate	taxes	on	wages	is
scarce.	Some	studies	compare	wage	growth	in	countries	after	corporate	tax	reforms	to	wage	growth	in	other
countries	where	no	reforms	take	place.
The	trouble	is	that	wage	growth	differs	between	countries	for	many	reasons,	and	isolating	the	effect	of	the	tax	reform
is	challenging.	In	addition,	countries	do	not	change	tax	rates	very	often.	Other	studies	focus	on	single	countries	and
compare	sectors	or	firms	that	face	different	tax	burdens.	Here	the	challenge	is	that	the	tax	burden	itself	is	usually
influenced	by	the	behaviour	of	firms.
In	our	paper,	we	avoid	these	difficulties	by	exploiting	the	specific	institutional	setting	of	the	German	local	business	tax
(LBT)	to	identify	the	corporate	tax	incidence	on	wages.	There	is	substantial	tax	variation	at	the	local	level	in
Germany.	Our	analysis	combines	administrative	panel	data	on	the	universe	of	German	municipalities	with
administrative	linked	employer-employee	micro	data	from	social	security	records.	In	this	data,	we	observe	firms	in
3,522	municipalities,	leaving	us	with	6,802	tax	changes	for	identification.	About	90	per	cent	of	the	tax	changes	are
LBT	increases.
The	blue	line	in	Figure	1	shows	that	wages	decrease	significantly	after	tax	increases.	At	the	same	time,	our	event
study	estimates	are	flat	and	insignificant	in	the	periods	prior	to	a	tax	reform,	supporting	our	identifying	assumption
and	the	causal	interpretation	of	our	estimates.	We	also	show	that	tax	reforms	are	not	driven	by	local	business	cycles.
Intuitively,	we	find	a	larger	wage	response	for	large	tax	increases	as	indicated	by	green	line,	but	we	do	not	find
significant	effects	for	the	few	tax	decreases.
Figure	1.	Event	study	estimates
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Source:	Fuest,	Peichl	and	Siegloch	(2018)	based	on	LIAB	and	Statistical	Offices	of	the	Laender
Our	estimates	imply	that,	on	average,	51	per	cent	of	the	corporate	tax	burden	is	passed	onto	workers.	This	average
effect	is	similar	to	other	studies	analysing	the	corporate	tax	incidence	on	wages	(such	as	Arulampalam,	Devereux
and	Maffini,	2012;	Liu	and	Altshuler,	2013;	Suárez	Serrato	and	Zidar,	2016).
Note	that	the	overall	tax	burden	includes	the	excess	burden	of	the	corporate	tax.	Empirical	estimates	suggest	that
the	marginal	excess	burden	of	the	corporate	tax	is	roughly	30	per	cent	of	the	revenue	raised	(Devereux,	Liu	and
Loretz,	2014).	This	implies	that	raising	one	euro	of	tax	revenue	via	corporate	taxes	reduces	wages	by	roughly	65
cents	or	two-thirds	of	the	revenue	raised.
We	find	that	different	types	of	firms	and	employees	are	affected	differently	by	tax	changes.	First,	labour	market
institutions	matter.	In	particular,	collective	bargaining	agreements	play	a	key	role	(as	emphasised	by	Arulampalam,
Devereux	and	Maffini,	2012	and	Felix	and	Hines	2009):	if	wages	are	set	via	collective	bargaining	at	the	firm	level,
wage	responses	are	larger	than	in	cases	where	wages	are	set	at	the	sector	level	or	without	collective	bargaining.
The	higher	the	rents	to	be	shared	between	firms	and	workers,	the	higher	the	pass-through	on	wages.	For	instance,
wages	are	more	sensitive	to	tax	changes	in	more	profitable	firms.	However,	we	find	that	wage	effects	are	close	to
zero	for	very	large	firms,	foreign-owned	firms	and	for	firms	that	operate	in	multiple	jurisdictions.	This	can	be
explained	by	better	profit-shifting	capabilities	of	these	firms.
Second,	different	types	of	workers	are	affected	differently.	We	show	that	higher	taxes	reduce	wages	most	for	the	low-
skilled,	for	women,	and	for	young	workers.	These	results	qualify	the	widespread	view	that	the	corporate	income	tax	is
highly	progressive.
We	assess	the	implications	of	these	findings	for	tax	progressivity	in	a	back-of-the-envelope	calculation.	Our	starting
point	is	the	study	on	the	progressivity	of	the	US	tax	system	by	Piketty	and	Saez	(2007)	who	assume	that	corporate
taxes	fall	entirely	on	capital	income.	We	take	their	data	and	estimates	as	a	benchmark	for	the	US	and	use
comparable	data	for	Germany.	We	then	compute	two	counterfactuals	where	50	per	cent	(or	100	per	cent)	of
corporate	taxes	fall	on	wages.	Our	calculations	show	that	the	progressivity	of	the	overall	tax	system	in	both	countries
would	decline	by	between	25	and	40	per	cent	if	we	account	for	our	incidence	estimates.
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To	sum	up,	our	results	confirm	the	view	that	labour	bears	a	substantial	share	of	the	corporate	tax	burden.	This
reduces	the	overall	progressivity	of	the	tax	system.	Importantly,	our	results	are	obtained	by	exploiting	variation	at	the
local	level.	Corporate	taxes	levied	at	the	subnational	level	exist	in	many	countries,	and	our	results	are	likely	to	be
relevant	in	these	countries	as	well.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	important	to	discuss	how	our	findings	are	related	to	settings
with	state-level	or	national	corporate	taxes.	Two	differences	are	important.	On	the	one	hand,	labour	is	likely	to	be
more	mobile	at	the	local	level,	which	attenuates	the	incidence	on	wages.	On	the	other	hand,	focusing	on	tax	changes
at	the	municipal	level	implies	that	changes	of	prices	other	than	wages,	in	particular	output	prices	and	prices	of
intermediate	goods,	are	probably	much	smaller	than	in	the	case	of	national	corporate	tax	changes.	This	would	imply
that	wage	effects	of	local	tax	changes	are	larger.
♣♣♣
Notes:
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